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NOTE
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board: California's Three-Factor Apportionment
Formula for Taxing U.S. Corporations'
Foreign Subsidiaries Held Constitutional
In Container Corporation of Amertca v. Franchise Tax Board,' the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality2 of California's corpo-
rate franchise tax, which utilizes a three-factor apportionment formula of
payroll, property, and sales 3 along with the unitary business principle,4
to tax the income of U.S. corporations' fully-integrated 5 foreign subsidi-
I -U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933, reh'g denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983) (No. 81-
523).
2 The tax was attacked for due process and commerce clause violations.
3 CAL. REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE § 25101 (West 1979) provides as follows:
Derivation from domestic and foreign sources; measure of tax; apportionment
When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax imposed under this part is
derived from or attributable to sources both within and without the state the tax
shall be measured by the net income derived from or attributable to sources
within this state in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 (commencing with
Section 25210 of this chapter); provided, however, that any method of apportion-
ment shall take into account as income derived from or attributable to sources
without the state, income derived from or attributable to transportation by sea or
air without the state, whether or not such transportation is located in or subject to
the jurisdiction of any other state, the United States or any foreign country.
If the Franchise Tax Board reapportions net income upon its examination of
any return, it shall, upon the written request of the taxpayer, disclose to it the
basis upon which its reapportionment has been made.
Other relevant statutes are as follows:
Property factor
The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value
of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in
this state during the income year and the denominator of which is the average
value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented
and used during the income year. Id. § 25129.
Payroll factor
The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount
paid in this state during the income year by the taxpayer for compensation, and
the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the
income year. Id. § 25129.
Sales factor
The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the
taxpayer in this state during the income year, and the denominator of which is
the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the income year. Id. § 25129.
4 See inf/ra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
5 A fully-integrated business is one that does not look to outside sources for supplies,
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aries. The formula was upheld despite the fact that it resulted in multi-
ple taxation.6 The decision, although necessitated by the dearth of
uniform legislation 7 in this area, may not only result in a state taxing and
receiving more than its fair share of revenue, but it also ignores the fact
that foreign governments are concerned about the divergence in state
taxing formulas affecting foreign commerce and may take retaliatory
measures.
8
Container, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Chicago, Illi-
nois, is engaged in the production and distribution of paperboard pack-
aging materials.9 Its operations include producing paperboard out of
raw timber and wastepaper, and converting the paperboard into finished
products.10 During the 1963, 1964 and 1965 tax years, Container con-
trolled twenty foreign subsidiaries located in Latin America and Western
Europe.II Its interest in the subsidiaries ranged from 66.75 percent to
100 percent,' 2 with the percentage not owned by Container owned by
local nationals. All of the subsidiaries, 13 except one, 14 were engaged in
the paperboard packaging business.
Container and its subsidiaries were fully integrated except for some
outside purchasing of paperboard and other products.' 5 Container
purchased no materials from the subsidiaries and did not engage in joint
marketing efforts with them. 16 Purchases of materials from Container by
the subsidiaries accounted for about one percent of the subsidiaries' total
purchases. 17 The subsidiaries were essentially managed in the same
manner as Container's U.S. operations. Container operated under a pol-
icy of decentralization using regional vice-presidents.' 8 Each of the for-
eign subsidiaries employed a senior vice-president and four officers from
the local citizenry.' 9 If this arrangement was unfeasible, Container as-
signed personnel to the subsidiaries. 20 Container's employees had no for-
mal training but some of the foreign employees spent two to six weeks in
materials, or assistance in manufacturing its product. For example, a corporation may grow the
trees it uses to make paper products. Some of its employees will then cut down the trees. The
lumber will then be treated and turned into paper products at the corporation's own plants.
6 California's formula taxed Container on income that had already been taxed to
Container's subsidiaries by the foreign governments where the subsidiaries were located.
7 See in/fa notes 156-80 and accompanying text.
8 See infa notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
9 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
10 Id.
Id
12 Id
13 One of these subsidiaries was inactive.
14 This subsidiary acted as a holding company.
15 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id at 2944. Container's first foreign subsidiary was established in Columbia in 1944.
19 Id
20 Id Container encouraged self-reliance by its subsidiaries and practiced a "hands-off
attitude" toward the management of the subsidiaries because they sought to emphasize local
responsibility and accountability, to appeal to local customers and governments, and to take
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the United States familiarizing themselves with the U.S. operations. 2'
These trips were financed by the foreign subsidiaries.
22
Day-to-day management of the subsidiaries was handled by the lo-
cal executives, although any important decisions were reviewed by
Container's management. 23 Container was represented on the board of
directors of most of the subsidiaries, 24 and provided the subsidiaries with
technical advice concerning manufacturing techniques, engineering, de-
sign, architecture, insurance, and cost accounting. 25 On occasion,
Container also sold used equipment to the subsidiaries, or employed its
purchasing department to act as an agent for the subsidiaries.
26
During the years in question, Container made loans to the subsidiar-
ies of $7,704,987, $7,155,714, and $3,223,371.27 The subsidiaries fur-
nished Container with budget information and financial data on a
regular basis, and although their tax returns were prepared locally, the
same accounting firm used by Container for its audits also audited most
of the subsidiaries.
28
Container filed California franchise tax returns for the years at issue
but did not include any of the subsidiaries' income.2 9 It calculated the
portion of its payroll, property, and sales taxable under California's stat-
utory three-factor formula, 30 but omitted any of the payroll, property, or
sales of its subsidiaries. 3i
The Franchise Tax Board (FTB) issued notices of deficiency to
Container, alleging that its foreign subsidiaries were part of its unitary
advantage of the fact that the packaging industry is highly sensitive to the differing consumer
habits of different nations. 103 S. Ct. at 2944 & n.8.
During the years at issue, 38 of Container's 13,400 employees were assigned to foreign
subsidiaries. These employees were maintained on Container's payroll. Some employees were
transferred to the foreign subsidiaries and placed on the payroll of the foreign subsidiary. Some
transferred employees continued to draw some pay and fringe benefits from Container.
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123
(1979).
21 103 S. Ct. at 2944.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id This advice was given either informally, or by entering into technical service
agreements.
26 Id.
27 Id. Container also guaranteed one-third of the subsidiaries' loans from outside sources.
28 Id.
29 Id
30 California's statutory formula is detailed supra at note 3.
31 Container's calculations of its income were as follows:
1963 1964 1965
Total income of unitary business $26,870,427.00 $28,774,320.48 $32,280,842.00
Percentage attributed to Calif. 11.041% 10.6422% 9.8%
Amount attributed to Calif. 2,966,763.85 3,062,220.73 3,174,368.00
Tax (5.5%) 163,172.01 168,422.14 174,590.00
103 S. Ct. at 2945 & n.1l.
The Franchise Tax Board alleged that Container's actual tax liability was as follows:
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
business and not a passive investment.3 2 According to the FTB,
Container had neglected to report its subsidiaries' income, which
wrongly decreased the portion of its income attributable to California. 33
Container paid the deficiency under protest and sued in California Supe-
rior Court for a refund. The court upheld the assessment, and the deci-
sion was affirmed on appeal. 34
Before the United States Supreme Court, Container argued that the
California Court of Appeals utilized a different legal standard in its anal-
ysis than the standard that had been articulated by the Supreme
Court.35 Container contended that the state court improperly relied
upon Container's "mere potential' 36 to control its subsidiaries as a crucial
factor in its determination that it constituted a unitary business.3 7 It
further argued that the state court erred in presuming that subsidiary
corporations involved in the same line of business constitute a unitary
business.38 Container argued that a prerequisite to finding that a corpo-
ration is a unitary business is a finding that a substantial flow of goods
exists between the corporate entities.39 Morever, according to Container,
California's three-factor apportionment formula was distorted due to
lower costs of production in the foreign countries where Container's sub-
sidiaries were located, which resulted in an unfair apportionment of in-
come to California, a violation of due process. 4° Finally, Container
alleged that California's tax was violative of the Commerce Clause be-
cause it resulted in multiple taxation in fact, 4 1 taxing income from sub-
1963 1964 1965
Total income of unitary business $37,348,183.00 $44,245,879.00 $46,884,966.00
Percentage attributed to Calif. 8.6886% 8.3135% 7.65%
Amount attributed to Calif. 3,245,034.23 3,673,381.15 3,588,012.00
Tax (5.5%) 178,476.88 202,310.95 197,340.00
32 103 S. Ct. at 2945. If a subsidiary is held by a corporation as a passive investment then
it is not part of the corporation's unitary business. &e Keesling and Warren, The Unitary Concept
In the Allocation ofIncome, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42 (1960).
33 d
34 The California Supreme Court refused to grant discretionary review. The United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 456 U.S.
960 (1982).
35 103 S. Ct. at 2946.
36 Id Container's argument here is taken from F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and
Revenue Dept. of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 355, 363 (1982). See infda notes 141-53 and accompa-
nying text. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a state court's finding that a corporation
was a unitary business. The Court said that the state court's decision was based upon the tax-
payer's potential relationship with its subsidiaries, and not upon actual facts that demonstrated
interdependence between the parent corporation and its subsidiaries.
37 103 S. Ct. at 2946.
38 Id. at 2947.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2948. Container presented evidence that wage rates and other production costs
were lower in the foreign countries. Brief for Appellant 12. Container also presented evidence
that its subsidiaries operated under a greater profit margin than it did. Brief for Appellant 14.
41 Brief for Appellant 21-26. This is in contrast to the mere threat of multiple taxation
which the Supreme Court is more apt to tolerate. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange-
les, 441 U.S. 434, 451-52 (1979).
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sidiaries that was also taxed by foreign governments, and because it
prevented the U.S. Government from acting uniformly in matters affect-
ing international affairs.
4 2
The Court summarily rejected Container's contention that an im-
proper legal standard was applied by the state court, asserting that the
state court relied principally on evidence detailing the management rela-
tionship between Container and its subsidiaries in reaching its decision.
43
The Court also quickly dismissed Container's argument that the state
court erred in its presumption that corporations engaged in the same line
of business constitute a unitary business,44 although it hastened to point
out that this presumption45 was only one of many factors which
prompted the state court's decision. 46 The Court was similarly unrecep-
tive to Container's premise that a flow of goods was needed for the state
court to find a unitary business.4 7 The proper prerequisite to a finding of
a unitary business was not a flow of goods, admonished the Court, but a
flow of value - meaning goods, or any number of items representing
value. 4
8
The Court addressed Container's constitutional challenges to Cali-
fornia's three-factor formula in greater detail.49 It rejected Container's
argument that California's formula violated due process by distorting the
true allocation of income between Container and its subsidiaries, result-
ing in a misalloction of income to California. 50 The Court criticized
Container's use of arms-length, separate accounting principles to arrive
at this argument, reasoning that separate accounting fails to account for
benefits received by Container as a unitary business. 5t The Court voiced
42 Brief for Appellant 27.
43 103 S. Ct. at 2946.
44 Id. at 2947.
45 However, the Court argued that this presumption was a "reasonable" one since a corpo-
ration that enlists subsidiaries in its same line of business is "likely to make better use - either
through economies of scale or through operational integration or sharing of expertise - of the
parent's existing business-related resources."
46 Id. The state court was presented with detailed evidence of the interaction between
Container and its subsidiaries including loans, loan guarantees, assistance in obtaining new and
used equipment, assistance in filling personnel needs, and other technical assistance. See the
Court's discussion, 103 S. Ct. at 2947, and the factual summary infta at notes 15-28 and accom-
panying text.
47 103 S. Ct. at 2947.
48 Id. The Court sought evidence of the interdependence among the parent and its subsid-
iaries. This interdependence was represented by functional integration, economies of scale, and
ceniralization of management. These factors contributed to Container's income and could not
be sourced to any one corporation. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of
New Mexico, 458 U.S. 355 (1982). The Court noted that some scholars have suggested that a
flow of goods would be a proper test for a unitary business. 103 S. Ct. at 2947 n. 17 and material
cited therein. But the Court rejected this viewpoint.
49 The Court prefaced its discussion at this point with a reminder that the taxpayer carries
the burden of proving that the income attributed to the state does not bear a rational relation-
ship to the interstate value of the corporation. 103 S. Ct. at 2948.
5 Id
51 Id at 2948-49. The Court argued that separate accounting was theoretically weak and
was not useful with a unitary business because the benefits received from functional integration,
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
its approval of formula apportionment over separate accounting based
upon the wide acceptance that formula apportionment has received from
state taxing authorities, and noted its belief that California's formula of
"payroll, property, and sales appear in combination to reflect a very
large share of the activities by which value is generated. '52
Finally, in addressing Container's allegations that California's tax
scheme violated the Commerce Clause, the Court compared the instant
case to an earlier tax case involving foreign commerce, Japan Line, Lid v.
County of Los Angeles. 53 In Japan Litne, the Court rejected California's at-
tempts to place a fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory ad valorem 54
property tax on cargo containers temporarily present 55 in California,56
holding that the tax was unconstitutional because it resulted in multiple
taxation of instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce 5 7 and because
it violated the policy of the U.S. Government to speak with one voice in
regulating foreign trade. 58 The Court admitted that Container, like the
taxpayer in Japan Line, was subject to double taxation, 59 and that the
double tax in both cases was due to the divergence of the California tax-
economies of scale, and centralization of management could not be properly accounted for.
The Court said such benefits were incapable of being sourced to a particular location and sourc-
ing is precisely how separate accounting allocates income. See 103 S. Ct. at 2948-49 (quoting
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Texas of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)).
52 103 S. Ct. at 2949. The Court admitted that formula apportionment had its imperfec-
tions in that the weight given to the various factors was arbitrary. Id at n.20. It reasoned,
however, that the margin of error in formula apportionment was not so great compared to
Container's result using separate accounting as to require the court to force California to adopt
a different method of taxation. Id at 2949-50. The California method represented only a 14%
increase over the amount arrived at by separate accounting (or about $72,000). Id. at 2950 and
tables at 2945 & nn. 11-12. The Court stated that this was a "far cry" from the 250% difference
that prompted them to strike down the state tax in Han Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283
U.S. 123 (1931). 103 S. Ct. at 2950.
53 444 U.S. 434 (1979). Japan Line has been the subject of much discussion and critical
comment. See, e.g., Note, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, The Foreign Commerce
Clause.- An Economic Approach to the Negative Effects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 793
(1980); Note, Constitutional Law - The Scope of the Commerce Clause in International Commerce -
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), 55 WASH. L. REV. 885 (1980);
Note, Taxation - State Property Taxation oflapanese Shipping Cargo Containers Used Exclusively in
Foreign Commerce and Belonging to Companies Based, Registered and Fully Taxed in Japan, is Unconstitu-
tional Under the Commerce Clause: Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 15
TEX. INT'L L.J. 213 (1980); Note, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979), 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 319 (1980); Note, Constitutional Law - State Taxation of Foreign Com-
merce - A State Tax, Although Consistent With Commerce Clause Requirements for Interstate Commerce,
May not Be Applied Uniaterally to Foreign Commerce: Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 47
U.S.L.W. 4477 (U.S. April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378), 45 J. AIR L. CoM. 559 (1980).
54 An ad valorem property tax is a tax of a fixed percentage of the value of the property to
be taxed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1981).
55 The containers averaged a stay in California of less than three weeks. Agreed State-
ment in Lieu of Clerk's and Reporters Transcripts 29, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange-
les, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
56 Id.
57 The Court in Container saidjapan Line left open the question of the taxation of "domesti-
cally owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce," 103 S. Ct. at 2952 (quoting Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 444 n.7), which the Court felt included the situation in Container.
5 441 U.S. at 453-54.
59 103 S. Ct. at 2951.
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ing scheme and that of foreign taxing authorities. 6° Moreover, there was
evidence that the method of taxation adopted by the foreign authorities
was consistent with accepted international practice, as it had been in
Japan Line.6 1 The Court argued, however, that there were several impor-
tant distinctions betweenJapan Line and Container. Unlike the taxpayer
in Japan Line, Container was being taxed on income, not property.62
Also, the Court viewed the multiple taxation of Container as not an inev-
itable result of California's taxing scheme, while in Japan Line there was
of necessity 63 double taxation. 64
As to whether their decision would have an impact on federal uni-
formity, or damage U.S. international trade relations, the Court found
no threat of danger.65 It noted that Container involved the taxation of a
corporation domiciled and headquartered in the United States, whileJa-
pan Line involved a direct tax on an instrumentality of foreign commerce
owned by foreign merchants. 66 Hence, the Court stated, the real impact
of the tax would be felt by Container as a domestic corporation and not
by the foreign corporations.6 7 Also, according to the Court, there were
no other indications68 that the tax on Container was offensive to U.S.
foreign policy. 69 Thus, the judgment of the California Court of Appeals
was affirmed.
The right to levy taxes upon their constituents is reserved to the
60 Id at 2951-52.
61 Id at 2952.
62 Id. The Court stated that the reasons for careful allocation to the proper situs carried
less weight with income than with property tax. Id. (citing Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 445). The
Court analogized the allocation of income to the proper situs to "slicing a shadow" and refused
to force California to adopt a method of taxation that might also lead to double taxation. 103
S. Ct. at 2954.
63 The Court said multiple taxation was inevitable in Japan Lint because Japan claimed
the right to tax the container in full, while California claimed the right to tax the container in
part.
64 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
65 Id. at 2955-57.
66 Id. at 2952.
67 Id. at 2955-56. The Court did not view retaliation by foreign nations through the crea-
tion of taxation schemes detrimental to U.S. corporations as a real threat.
68 The Court considered the fact that the Solicitor General did not file an amicus curiae
brief in opposition to the tax to be an important factor. It also noted that the Solicitor General
did submit a brief opposing worldwide formula apportionment in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349 (pending before the Court at that time). 103 S. Ct. at 2956
& n.33. The Court declined to speculate as to why no brief was submitted and stated that it had
received no indication that the views in Chicago Bridge still reflected the views of the Govern-
ment, or that the brief in that case was applicable to Container. Chicago Bridge was subse-
quently dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 104 S. Ct. 542 (1984). Federal
preemption concerns, or concerns of conflict with international tax treaties were dismissed on
the ground that each nation is to formulate its own method of taxing domestic corporations.
Furthermore, Contatner was viewed as a taxation matter of local, not international concern. 103
S. Ct. at 2956. In regard to matters of state taxation, the Court noted that Congress had de-
clined to enact uniform taxation. Id. at 2956 & n.32.
69 103 S. Ct. at 2956. The Court commented that even if foreign nations had an interest
in reducing the tax burden of domestic corporations, the fact remained that Container did owe
California some tax.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REC.
states by the tenth amendment. 70 This power is limited, however, by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7' A state tax on inter-
state commerce must thus undergo a due process analysis. It must "[be]
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, [be]
fairly apportioned, . . . not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and [be] fairly related to the services provided by the state. ' '72 In addi-
tion, when a state tax is upon instrumentalities of foreign commerce,
there are several constitutional considerations under the Commerce
Clause, including the need for federal uniformity in international affairs
and the avoidance of multiple taxation. 73 The tax in Container was at-
tacked as both a violation of the Commerce Clause74 and as a violation
of due process. 75
I. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several
States .... 76 Thus, it has been held that if a state tax "creates a sub-
stantial risk of international multiple taxation, [or] prevents the Federal
Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments,"' it violates the Commerce Clause.
77
A. Multiple Taxation
Taxation is the price paid by those engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce for benefits received from the taxing state.78 Multiple taxa-
tion is deemed unfair, however, because it creates a burden on interstate
commerce 79 to the advantage of intrastate commerce.8 0 While multiple
70 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
71 "[Nlor shall any State deprive any persons of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72 japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444-45; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Assoc. of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750
(1978).73 ]apan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
74 Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2939-43.
75 Id
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
77 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
78 Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390 U.S. 317
(1968); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
79 Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972); Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S.
607, 612 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311
(1938); Western Line Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).
80 See Comment, Limitation on State Taxation of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary Viahty of
the Hsome Port Doctrine, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 828 (1979); Developments in the Law, Federal Ltimia-
tions on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 965 (1962). See also Washing-
ton Revenue Dept. v. Assoc. of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978); Michelin Tire
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taxation is not per se violative of the Commerce Clause,"' a state's tax is
unconstitutional if it exacts more than its "fair share" of tax revenue.
82
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in several cases where the
tax at issue involved foreign commerce. In Japan Line 83 for example, the
Court held that California's ad valorem property tax on Japanese cargo
containers was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it
represented multiple taxation in fact8 4 and because it prevented the U.S.
Government from speaking with one voice in its relations with foreign
countries.8 5 Multiple taxation existed in Japan Line because Japan right-
fully 86 taxed the containers in full and California then taxed the contain-
ers in part.87 Japan Line was the first case to declare a state tax
unconstitutional because of the multiple tax burden it created on foreign
commerce.
Other cases in foreign commerce have involved the question of
whether the taxation by a state of dividends received by a parent corpo-
ration from its foreign subsidiary subjected the parent to multiple taxa-
tion.88 In each of these cases, the Court focused on whether a unitary
business existed.8 9 If a corporation and its subsidiaries constitute a uni-
tary business9° (assuming that the state tax passes all other constitutional
hurdles)9i then there exists a presumption that the state tax is accurate
and it may be applied to a proportionate share of the business income.
92
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).
The Supreme Court has admonished that interstate and foreign commerce must "pay their
own way," subject to the consideration that taxes bear a "fair relation" to benefits conferred.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590, 600 (1954).
81 The Supreme Court inJapan Line appeared to set out a clear policy that if a state tax
results in multiple taxation of foreign commerce, it violates the commerce clause. Id at 446-52.
But the majority in Container stepped back from this clear policy to say that the tax in Container
was proper because it was not inevitable multiple taxation, as was the tax in Japan Line. 103 S.
Ct. at 2952. The Court also noted that forcing California to change its taxing scheme would
possibly not eliminate double taxation. Id. at 2954.
82 See, e.g., Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1930).
83 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
84 Id at 452. The Court said that there was multiple taxation in fact, in contrast to the
risk of multiple taxation, because Japan had the right to tax the containers in full.
85 Id
86 The containers were rightfully taxed in Japan because that was where they were owned,
registered, and based, and they were used exclusively in international commerce. Id at 451-52.
87 Id at 452.
88 ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (Idaho's tax of a
nondomiciliary parent corporation's receipt of dividends from its foreign subsidiaries was un-
constitutional); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of the State of New Mex-
ico, 458 U.S. 355 (1982) (New Mexico's tax of parent corporation on dividends received from
foreign subsidiaries was unconstitutional); Cf Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of
Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, (1980) (Vermont's tax on parent, N.Y. corporation's receipt of divi-
dends from foreign subsidiaries upheld). See in/la notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
89 ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 322-24; Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 3134-39; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439-40.
90 See in/ra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
91 This reference is to hurdles under the due process clause. See supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
92 See discussion in Note, in/fa note 107, at 126 & n.183.
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If, however, a corporation is found not to be a unitary business, then a
state tax on income of a corporation earned outside the state's borders is
unconstitutional. 93
B. Federal Uniformity
The concern for federal uniformity, or that the federal government
"speak with one voice" when regulating areas that have foreign policy
implications 94 is a crucial one. In the area of foreign commerce, 9 5
"[e]ven a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be deemed de
mini'mi's in a domestic context - assumes importance when sensitive mat-
ters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned."'96 Uni-
formity is crucial because of the disruption that a lack of uniformity
could cause in international relations, 97 and because of the possibility
that a nation could retaliate in a manner detrimental to U.S. interests. 98
In light of the importance of federal uniformity in matters affecting
foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has continued to maintain strict con-
trol over any state action that could hinder foreign relations. 99 For ex-
ample, in Zschermzg v. Miler,1° ° an Oregon probate statute which
93 See, e.g., Mobil, 445 U.S. 425.
94 The Supreme Court has long held that matters affecting foreign affairs are exclusively
within the control of the federal government. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 & n.13; Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968); Board of Trustees of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933); United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Colley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 319 (1851).
95 The Supreme Court has followed the philosophy that the framers of the Constitution
intended for the scope of foreign commerce power to be greater than that of interstate com-
merce. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 & n.13, and cases cited therein. For a discussion of this
philosophy, see Note, State Taxation oflnternational Air Carriers, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 92, 101 and
n.42 (1962); Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporapy Comment,
25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 465-75 (1941).96 japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456.
97 See discussion in Note, Japan Line, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles, The Foreign Commerce
Clause.- An Economic Approach to the Negative E ffects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 793, 810
(1980). Nonuniformity in apportionment methods could create international disputes where
there is no authoritative tribunal to resolve them. Id
98 Retaliation by foreign nations disadvantaged by state actions is a concern expressed
frequently by the Solicitor General. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Solicitor General in Chi-
cago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349 at 16 (citing Chy Lung v. Free-
man, 92 U.S. 275 (1876)). In Chy Lung, the Court stated that without a policy of federal
uniformity, "a single state [could], at her pleasure embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other
nations." 92 U.S. at 279.
There is also the concern that countries will retaliate by enacting tax laws harmful to U.S.
interests because many nations grant exemptions from taxation on the basis of reciprocity. See
discussion in Note, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, The Foreign Commerce Clause.- An
Economic Approach to the Negative Effects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 753, 810-11 & nn.
120, 121 (1980).
99 But f Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, rehg denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976)
(Georgia's ad valorem property tax on inventory of imported tires upheld). The expected flood
of similar tax statutes did not materialize after the Michelih decision; see Hellerstein, Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 99 (1977).
100 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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provided that property would escheat when claimed by a nonresident
alien unless certain requirements were met was invalidated. 10 1 Accord-
ing to the Court, the requirements of the statute involved Oregon in for-
eign affairs "which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
Congress.' 1 2 In United States v. Belmont, 103 the Court upheld an interna-
tional compact entered into between the U.S. and Soviet Governments
against contradictory interests held by a banker in New York. A Soviet
corporation had deposited money in a bank in New York and was subse-
quently dissolved by the Soviet Government which appropriated all of
its assets.' 0 4 Thereafter, the United States established diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet Government and agreed to turn over the corpora-
tion's funds to the Soviets. The Court upheld the actions of the U.S.
Government, stating that "no state policy could prevail against the inter-
national compact."' 1 5 State laws and policies were viewed as irrevelant
to the "effective operation of a federal constitutional power.
°10 6
The decision inJapan Line was also based in large part on a need for
federal uniformity. 10 7 The Court discerned a trend toward uniform
treatment of the containers at issue. 10 8 It held that the divergence of
California's taxing formula prevented the federal government from
speaking with one voice in international trade. ' 0 9 Federal uniformity in
matters affecting international trade was viewed as paramount. 110 Thus,
the tax in Japan Line was unconstitutional because it violated this "one
voice" standard."'*
II. Due Process
Generally, the states have been given broad discretion to tax corpo-
rate entities within their borders.1 1 2 In the exercise of that discretion,
several states have utilized separate accounting principles to compute an
intrastate corporation's tax.' 13 Under separate accounting, the precise
101 Id at 430-32. These requirements were as follows: (1) a reciprocal right to take prop-
erty under the same terms must be provided to U.S. citizens in the foreign country; (2) U.S.
citizens must have the right to receive payment in the United States from estates in the foreign
country; and (3) foreign heirs must have the right to receive money from the Oregon estates
without it being confiscated.
102 Id at 432-41.
103 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
104 Id at 326.
105 Id at 327.
106 Id at 332.
107 103 S. Ct. at 448-51.
108 Id at 452.
109 Id at 453.
10 Id. at 451-54.
I' See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Colley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
319 (1851).
112 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
113 See discussion in Keesling, The Combined Report and Worldwide Businesses, 60 TAXES 304,
304-05 (1982).
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geographical source of a corporation's profits is determined and the cor-
poration is taxed on the income earned in that particular state or geo-
graphic area. 1 4  Although this method produces a satisfactory result
when activities carried on within a state are truly separate from any busi-
ness conducted outside the state," 15 a substantial amount of revenue can
be garnered from corporations operating in both interstate and foreign
commerce. 1 6 These multistate and multinational corporations create a
problem in tax computation because when the individual subsidiaries are
interdependent, an accurate measurement of taxable income through
utilization of separate accounting methods is difficult.' 1 7 Interdepen-
dence of business activities, in and out of a state, creates a unitary busi-
ness" l8 which is taxed using formula apportionment methods. 119
A. Unitay Business Princip/e
What constitutes a unitary business has been and continues to be
the subject of considerable controversy and confusion. 120  A unitary
business has been defined as one in which "the operation of the portion
of the business within the state is dependent upon or contributory to the
operation of the business outside the state."''2 It has also been described
as "either . . . an interstate business which is so integrated as to make
separate accounting for the in-state business impossible, or . . . an inter-
state business in which the in-state activities contribute to the out-of-state
business and the out-of-state activities contribute to the in-state busi-
114 Id See also Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
115 See Keesling,supra note 113, at 304-05; Palestin, Interstate Taxation. Non-Unitary Corporation
-Should Statutor Apportionment )ield to Separate Accounting?, 1965 PROCS. NAT. TAX A. 531.
116 See comments of Senator Church on the impact that interstate revenues would have on
California's economy; Church, Senator Church on Unitary Taxation, 11 TAX NOTES 6, 6 (1980).
The taxation of interstate and foreign commerce has met with much approval by the states and
the courts due to a belief that interstate commerce should "pay its own way." See Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976). According to the Supreme Court, the tax on interstate commerce is the price paid for
benefits received. See Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 289. See also Northwestern States Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458-62 (1959). Cf Developments in the Law, Federal Limita-
tions on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953 (1962).
117 See Keesling, supra note 113, 304-05; Note, The Unitary Tax Method- Are the Factors Used by
California in the Determination of Unity Still Viable After ASARCO and Woolworth', 15 PAC. L.J.
109, 113 (1983); Palestin,supra note 115; Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business.- The Unitary
Business Concept and Afiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171, 191-92 (1970).
118 See infra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 156-98 and accompanying text.
120 For a discussion of the unitary business principle and its application, see, e.g., G. ALT-
MAN and F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION (2d ed. 1950); Dexter,
Tax Apportionment of the Income of a Unitag Business and an Examination of Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REV. 107; Hellerstein, Recent Developments in
State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NATIONAL TAX J. 487 (1968);
Keesling, The Impact of the Mobil Case on Apportionment of Income, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REV. 87; Kees-
ling and Warren, supra note 32; Rudolph, supra note 107; Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of
Income and Expenses Among National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 HARV. J. L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 409
(1978); Note, supra note 117.
121 ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 120, at 110.
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ness.' 122  The definition is of particular importance because the
Supreme Court views the unitary business principle as "the linchpin of
apportionability in the field of state income taxation .... ,"123 Thus,
while a state tax must pass muster under the due process clause, 24 a
court's finding that a corporation and its subsidiaries constitute a unitary
business includes a finding that the state tax was applied to a corporation
that has a nexus with the taxing state and benefits from services provided
by the state.' 25 The state tax is presumed valid and the burden shifts to
the corporation to prove that the income at issue was earned in activities
outside the unitary business. 126
In practice, the Supreme Court's application of the unitary business
principle appears somewhat haphazard. Businesses do not have to be
entirely separate to qualify as non-unitary. 127 The Court has declined,
however, to detail precisely what factors constitute a unitary business
and how much weight each factor will carry.' 28 Early cases turned upon
the fact that the taxpayer had the burden of overcoming the presump-
tion that a state's method of taxation produced an unfair result.' 29 For-
mulations of the present-day unitary business principle were present in
early cases but the concept was far from clear.' 3
0
In recent cases the taxpayer's difficulty with the burden of proof
continues, but a more concrete formulation of the factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether a unitary business exists is beginning to ap-
pear. The Supreme Court's decisions appear to indicate that functional
integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale are
several of the factors which belie a unitary business. In Mobil Oil Corpora-
lion v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 13 1 the Court held that Mobil, an
integrated petroleum corporation with businesses in forty states (includ-
ing Vermont), the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries
was a unitary business.' 32 Vermont could tax a proportionate share of
122 Rudolph, supra note 117, at 184.
123 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439.
124 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Mobtl, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 447 U.S. 207
(1980).
126 See Seago, The Revrialzation of the Unitayy Business Principle - ASARCO and Woolworth,
I J. ST. TAX'N 101 (1982); F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1981).
127 Seago, supra note 126, at 104 n.15 and material cited therein.
128 See, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920) (Con-
necticut's tax on corporation organized in Delaware with manufacturing operations in Connect-
icut and sales in other states upheld); Bass Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission,
266 U.S. 271, 283-84 (1924) (New York tax on corporation with offices in New York and Chi-
cago, manufacturing in England, and sales in United States upheld); Cf Hans Rees' Sons, Inc.
v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 132-34 (1930) (North Carolina tax on corporation organized in
New York with only 1% of sales in N.C. and 47% of income taxable in N.C. was
unconstitutional).
129 Underwood, 254 U.S. at 120; Bass, 266 U.S. at 282; Hans Rees'Sons, 283 U.S. at 126-27.
130 See, e.g., Underwood, 254 U.S. 113.
131 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
132 Id. at 438-42.
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Mobil's foreign source income, ie., dividends received by Mobil from its
foreign subsidiary, unless Mobil could prove that the dividends were
earned in activites unrelated to the corporation's sale of petroleum prod-
ucts. 133 Mobil was unable to carry this burden. Thus, Vermont was al-
lowed to tax the dividends received by Mobil, the parent of a
"functionally integrated enterprise."' 1
34
Functional integration was again the focus in Exxon Corporation v.
Wisconsin Department of Revenue.' 35 Exxon, also an integrated petroleum
company engaged in exploration, production, refining, and market-
ing, 1 3 6 sought to utilize separate accounting 137 with its marketing opera-
tions which were conducted solely in Wisconsin. The Court held that
Exxon had failed to carry its burden of showing that its functional de-
partments were discrete business enterprises. 138 Accordingly, Wisconsin
was allowed to tax a proportionate share of Exxon's total income. 139
Some guidance was provided by the Court concerning what is not a
unitary business in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 140 and in
F W. Woolworth Company v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mex-
ico.141 Both cases involved the apportionment of dividends received by a
parent from its foreign subsidiary. In ASARCO, the taxpayer was en-
gaged in the mining, smelting, and refining of nonferrous metals. 142
Substantial evidence 43 was presented by ASARCO that its subsidiaries
133 Id at 440. The Court noted that Mobil did not contest the fact that it was a unitary
business and in fact regularly submitted tax returns combining all its operating income without
regard to location. Id. at 437.
134 Id. at 440.
135 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
136 d at 211L
137 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
138 447 U.S. at 224.
139 Id at 230.
140 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
141 458 U.S. 355 (1982). ASARCO and Woolworth have already been subject to much criti-
cal comment and discussion. See, e.g., Seago, supra note 126; Note, supra note 117.
142 458 U.S. at 309.
"43 This suit involved five foreign subsidiaries: M.I.M. Holdings, Ltd.; General Cable
Corp.; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.; ASARCO Mexicana, S.A.; and Southern Peru Copper
Corp. Id. at 309. M.I.M. was viewed by the Court as an investment by ASARCO. Id. at 323.
M.I.M. sold only 1% of its output to ASARCO at market rates. ASARCO owns 52.7% of
M.I.M.'s stock, but M.I.M. chooses its own officers and directors and otherwise maintains mini-
mal contact with ASARCO. Id at 322-23. ASARCO owns approximately one-third interests
in General Cable and Revere Copper. In regard to these subsidiaries, ASARCO consented to
an antitrust decree that prohibits it from voting its stock held in them, from maintaining com-
mon officers in them, from acquiring stock in any other copper fabricators, or from selling
copper to them at prices lower than those quoted to their competitors. ASARCO has no con-
tact with these companies in regard to management or operational decisions. Id at 323-24.
Mexicana was originally owned wholly by ASARCO but Mexican law forced them to divest
themselves of 51% of their holdings. The Court did not disturb the state court's finding that
Mexicana operated independently of ASARCO. Id at 324. ASARCO held 51.5% of Southern
Peru's stock. Id at 320. Southern Peru sold 35% of its output to ASARCO. Id. at 321. The
state court found that ASARCO had the potential to control Southern Peru but that Southern
Peru's remaining three shareholders refused to participate in Southern Peru unless assured that
they would not be dominated by ASARCO. Thus, the parties entered into a management
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were separate entities, not controlled by ASARCO. 14 4 The subsidiaries
selected their own officers and boards of directors, 45 and any services
provided to the subsidiaries by ASARCO were provided at the same rate
paid by other companies. 146 The Court concluded that ASARCO and
its subsidiaries were "insufficiently connected" to permit a finding of a
unitary business. 147
In Woolworth the taxpayer was engaged in retail sales with chains of
stores located throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands.' 48 In holding that Woolworth's subsidiaries were not part of a
unitary business, 149 the Court was influenced by testimony that each
subsidiary acted autonomously in its selection of a store site, its advertis-
ing, and its control. 150 The Court found no evidence of economies of
scale due to centralized purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing. 15 1
Moreover, each subsidiary had control of its own management and em-
ployment decisions. 152  Thus, the decision in Woolworth was reached af-
ter a careful examination of the actual practices of the subsidiaries, not
just speculation as to the mere potential of Woolworth and its subsidiar-
ies to be a unitary business - which was the legal standard applied by
the state court.' 53
Despite all of this recent litigation, the contours of the unitary busi-
ness principle are still difficult to define and the Supreme Court is the
first to admit this, stating in Container "that [the unitary business princi-
ple] is not, so to speak, unitary: There are variations on the theme, and
any number of them are logically consistent with the underlying princi-
ples motivating the approach."' 154 This creates a problem which is read-
ily apparent to the taxpayer who seeks to refute the contention that his
corporation is a unitary business in order to rebut the presumption that
the method of formula apportionment used by a taxing state is
correct. 155
B. Formula Apportzonment Methods
Methods of formula apportionment 5 6 utilized by the states to tax
contract which insures, by voting requirements and shareholder selection, that ASARCO can-
not control Southern Peru. Id at 321-22.
144 458 U.S. at 320-24.
145 Id at 323.
146 See, e.g., id at 323 n.18.
147 458 U.S. at 322.
148 458 U.S. at 356.
149 Id at 369.
150 Id. at 365.
151 Id.
152 Id at 366-67.
153 Id. at 363.
154 103 S. Ct. at 2941.
155 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
156 Taxation by formula apportionment involves making a rough approximation of the
corporate income that is reasonably related to the corporation's activities within the taxing
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corporations engaged in interstate and foreign commerce vary from one
to three factor formulas using a combination of sales or gross receipts,
payroll, manufacturing costs, and tangible property.157 States also use
varying definitions' 58 of the above items. For example, a sale may be
defined either as occurring at the place of business where orders are
placed, or at the sale's destination.159 The diversity of formulas and
definitions has created considerable confusion and often results in multi-
ple, 160 or even under-taxation.161
For many years, the Supreme Court did little to lessen or to control
the increasing power of the states to tax interstate commerce. 162 Faced
with a diversity of formulas, it upheld them by default because the tax-
payers failed to meet their burden of showing that the formula used by
the taxing state was in error. 163 Formula apportionment methods gener-
ally met with the Court's approval because they resolved the conflict be-
tween the desire to have instrumentalities of interstate commerce pay
their own way and the principle that interstate commerce should not be
burdened with multiple taxation.164
In one of its first decisions on formula apportionment, Underwood
ypewrier Company v. Chamberlain ,165 the Court upheld Connecticut's
crude, single-factor formula based upon the proportion of tangible prop-
erty owned by the corporation within the taxing state. 16 6  The taxpayer
conducted its manufacturing in Connecticut and had branch offices and
state. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bain, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978). Formula apportionment methods
have been examined and criticized by many sources. See, e.g., G, ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, supra
note 120, at 97-102; Cohen, State Tax Allocations and Formulas Whir/i Aect Management Operating
Decisions, 1 J. OF TAX'N 7 (July 1954); Corrigan, Uniforinioty in Interstate Taxation, 13 TAX NOTES
200, 200 (1981); Dexter, supra note 120; Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 489; R. POSNER, ECo-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 515-16 (2d ed. 1977); Palestin, supra note 115, at 531.
157 Cohen, supra note 156 at 4. Cohen provides examples of how various formulas work. Id
at 4-5.
158 Id at 8-12.
159 Id at 8-10; see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBi-
COMMirTE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1964) (provides a detailed discussion of the various positions on taxation of
multistate and multinational corporations, discussing the various formulas and definitions
used).
160 See R. POSNER, supra note 156, at 515-16. Dexter, supra note 120, at 402-03, gives an
example of how a corporation's intangibles could theoretically be subject to "quintuple taxa-
tion," by being taxed in: 1) state of incorporation; 2) principal place of business; 3) place where
stock has business situs; 4) all states where it has income; and 5) all states that protect the
corporation's intangibles.
161 Dexter, supra note 120, at 403 n.8, discusses the fact that formulas may result in some
income not being taxed. This income is called "nowhere income." Id. Further discussion of
nowhere income can be found in Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolution
and a Modem Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 426 (1976); Hellerstein, State Taxation and the
Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 341 (1976).
162 See discussion in Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 489.
163 See, e.g., Underwood, 254 U.S, 113; Bass, 266 U.S. 271.
164 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Board of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590,
598 (1954).
165 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
166 1d at 121.
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sales in many other states.16 7 Connecticut taxed forty-seven percent of
the taxpayer's income, the percentage of real estate and tangible personal
property owned by the taxpayer within the state. 168 The Court stated
that Underwood had failed to show that Connecticut's method of taxa-
tion was inherently arbitrary or unreasonable. 1
69
Thereafter, until its decision in General Motors v. District of Colum-
bia,1 70 the Court exhibited an attitude of almost total acceptance of state
taxing formulas.171 In General Motors, however, it struck down a single-
factor sales formula holding that it was defective because it attributed
income to the District of Columbia from outside sources.' 7 2 General Mo-
tors sold cars in the District of Columbia but did no manufacturing
there.' 73 In comparing the single-factor sales formula to three-factor for-
mulas (which the Court said were used by most jurisdictions), the Court
stated that the single-factor formula was inconsistent and would result in
multiple taxation because it would tax fully what a three-factor formula
taxes in part. 1
74
Since General Motors, the Court has conducted a more thorough ex-
amination of state taxing formulas, studying the corporations involved to
discern whether a unitary business exists and whether the state taxing
formulas conform with due process. 175 It has been argued that the
Court's actions constitute a response to the growing criticism of its earlier
decisions which increased states' powers to tax intrastate commerce. 1
7 6
In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 7 7 and Ex-
167 Id. at 119.
168 Id. Underwood stated only that it received $43,000.00 of net profits in Connecticut and
$1,300,000.00 in the rest of the states where it sold its products. The Court noted, however, that
this did not deal with the fact that all monies were earned in transactions that started in Con-
necticut. Id.
169 Id. at 121.
170 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
171 Cf Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
172 380 U.S. at 555. The Court also expressed its approval of three-factor formulas. Id. at
559-60.
173 Id. at 559-60.
174 Id. at 661. The Court stated that "[tihe great majority of states imposing corporate
income taxes apportion the total income of a corporation by application of a three-factor
formula which gives equal weight to the geographical distribution of plant, payroll, and sales."
175 See, e.g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (Court found state tax on tangible personal
property of taxpayer engaged in out-of-state sales, and not services, was unfair burden on inter-
state commerce); Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390
U.S. 317, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 1046 (1968) (mileage formula used by Missouri to tax railroad
resulted in gross overreaching).
176 Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 495. Hellerstein also suggests that the Court was influ-
enced by the quick passage of Pub. L. No. 86-272, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959)), which
provided that a state had no jurisdiction to tax a corporation whose only activity within its
borders was the solicitation of orders accepted out-of-state and filled by shipment from a point
out-of-state. Businesses were quick to seek passage of Pub. L. No. 86-272 when the Supreme
Court approved the taxation of a corporation whose only activities within the taxing state were
those now set out in Pub. L. No. 86-272 as nontaxable. Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. State of Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
177 445 U.S. 1223 (1980).
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xon Corporation v. Wisconstn Dept. of Revenue ,l 78 the Court upheld the three-
factor apportionment formulas of Vermont and Wisconsin. In both
cases, the Court found that a unitary business existed. This finding cre-
ated a presumption that the state's taxing formula was accurate, which
shifted to the taxpayer the difficult burden of proving that the income at
issue was earned in activities unrelated to the unitary business.' 79  Being
unable to carry this burden, the taxpayers were taxed on a proportion of
their income. 180
Although the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for the
three-factor apportionment formula which it approved in General Mo-
tors,' 8 1 Butler Brothers v. McColgan, ' 2 and most recently in Container,18 3 it
has, on occasion, upheld even a single-factor formula.'8 4  Other sources
have also voiced approval for a three-factor formula,1 8 5 although con-
gressional proposals favor a two-factor approach. 8 6 Thus, while the
three-factor formula may be the most prevalent one in use, there is still
considerable diversity in state taxation formulas.
The decision in Container ignores the continuing concern expressed
by businesses 18 7 and foreign governments' 88 over the lack of uniformity
in state apportionment methods and the elusiveness of the unitary busi-
ness principle. Congressional proposals for uniform legislation have
failed,' 89 however, and local efforts by the states themselves have fallen
short of the needed support' 9° and have been subject to constitutional
attack. 191
In Container, the Court recognized that California's three-factor
178 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
'79 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439; Exxon, 447 U.S. at 223.
180 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439.
181 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
182 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
183 103 S. Ct. at 2949. The Court stated that "[t]he three-factor formula used by California
has gained wide approval precisely because payroll, property, and sales appear in combination
to reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated. It is therefore able to
avoid the sorts of distortions [of apportioning between 66% and 85% of the taxpayer's income to
the taxing state by utilizing a single-factor formula based entirely on ownership of tangible
property] that were present in Hans Rees' Sons. "
184 See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1929) (Court upheld Iowa single-
factor sales formula which attributed portion of income to state which gross sales made within
the state bore to total gross sales).
185 See, e.g., Keesling, supra note 113, at 306.
186 See Rudolph, supra note 117, at 174-75, discussing H.R. 11798, which proposed a uni-
form two-factor formula. The bill failed. Cf Hellerstein, Allocation Nexus in State Taxation of
Interstate Business, 20 TAx L. REV. 259 (1964).
187 See supra note 176.
188 See infra note 219-20 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190 A uniform method of taxation and a procedure for arbitration of disputes has been
adopted by 22 states. This procedure is called the Multistate Tax Compact. Note, State Taxation
of Interstate Businesses and the Multistate Tax Compact. The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, II
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROS. 231 (1975).
'9' Id at 247-54.
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formula using sales, property, and payroll has its imperfections. 192 For
example, the weight given to each factor is arbitrary,1 93 and the factors
can be manipulated to give more weight to those factors that will gener-
ate more revenue for the taxing state.194 There are also the previously
discussed problems of differing definitions of factors, and multiple or
even under-taxation. 9 5 The Court approved California's formula, how-
ever, because it viewed the three-factor formula as widely accepted, and
because it felt that the factors used by California "reflect[ed] a very large
share of the activities by which value is generated."' 96  The reason the
three-factor formula is so widely accepted may be that states realize the
revenue it can generate.' 9 7 Unfortunately, no thorough analysis of the
effects of the three-factor formula has been made. In both Container and
in Japan Line, however, California's three-factor formula resulted in
double taxation.' 98
The unitary business principle, also relied upon by the Court in
reaching its decision in Container, was described by the Court itself as
"not . . . unitary."' 99 The Court has discussed various factors it exam-
ines to determine whether a unitary business exists, e.g., centralization of
management, functional integration, or economies of scale, but it has
provided little guidance as to its application of these factors or the weight
to be given each factor.20 0 In fact, a corporation can have some unitary
factors and still not qualify as a unitary business.2 0' At some undefined
point, 20 2 the Court simply finds sufficient evidence to conclude that a
unitary business exists. 20 3 Container was held to be a unitary business
despite considerable evidence that its subsidiaries were autonomous,
20 4
and despite charges that the stipulations of fact relied upon by the state
court as unitary factors were misinterpreted.
20 5
192 103 S. Ct. at 2949.
193 Id. at 2949 & n.20.
194 McClure, Toward Uniformity in Interstate Taxation. A Further Analysis, 13 TAX NOTEs 51,
51 & n.1 (1981).
195 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
196 103 S. Ct. at 2949.
197 See 136 Daily Tax Reports G-5-G-61 (July 14, 1983) (discussing Florida's enactment of
a statute similar to California's statute in Container. The statute is expected to raise about $95
million annually and is to be used to upgrade Florida's education system).
198 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
199 103 S. Ct. at 2941.
200 See, e.g., Woolworth, 458 S. Ct. at 136-38. See also the table in Seago, supra note 127, at
117, detailing the unitary business factors set forth in Woolworth.
201 See supra note 127.
202 Seago, supra note 127, at 116.
203 One author suggests that the Container decision represents a tax break for multinational
corporations that can alter their corporate structure turning foreign corporations into passive
investments and thus providing protection from state taxation. See WhiteNack, State litaton
After the Container Decision, 20 TAX NOTES 771, 783 (Sept. 5, 1983).
204 103 S. Ct. at 2943-44. See WhiteNack, supra note 203, at 772-73 for a comparison of the
unitary v. non-unitary findings by the Court in Container.
205 See Peters, Supreme Ct. in Container, Upholds State'r Broad Power Under Unitaqy Taxation
Method, 57 J. TAX'N 300, 305 (1983).
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The Court's treatment of the Commerce Clause issues in Container is
also disturbing. The Court makes light of the fact that the California
taxing scheme has resulted in double taxation, 20 6 and distinguishes the
double tax in Container from the unconstitutional double tax in Japan
Line, arguing that in Japan Line the double tax is inevitable. 20 7 The
dissent disputes this, pointing out that double taxation will always be
inevitable under California's divergent taxing method because of the
weight given to the factors in its formula.2 0 8 The dissent also criticizes
California's three-factor formula by pointing out that it has no relation-
ship to the amount of income earned in a specific area because a higher
proportion of income is allocated to areas with higher wage rates, prop-
erty values and sales. 20 9 Although Container's subsidiaries earned more
money than it did, more income was attributed to Container because
California wages, property values, and sales costs are higher. 2 10
Also disturbing is the Court's dismissal of the possible foreign policy
implications of its decision. It prefaced its discussion with the remark
that "[tlhis Court has little competence in determining precisely when
foreign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less compe-
tence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against
the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as
they please."'2 11 The Court then proceeded to find no indication that the
Solicitor General is against the application of the unitary business princi-
ple and the formula apportionment method in Container.2 12 The Court
ignored a memorandum pending before it in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. ,213 a case dealing with the same issue. In the mem-
orandum, the Solicitor General states that "the imposition of [a state tax]
on the apportioned combined worldwide business income of a unitary
group of related corporations, impairs federal uniformity in an area
where such uniformity is essential.12 1 4 Refusing to rely on the Govern-
ment's position in Chicago Bridge as indicative of the Government's stance
in Container, the Court instead inexplicably assumed that the Govern-
ment had changed its viewpoint since Chicago Bridge.2 15
The possibility that any impact from its decision will be felt by for-
eign parties was similarly dismissed. 21 6 The Court regarded the matter
in Container as a local concern, 2 17 stating that the tax in Container is on a
206 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
207 Id
208 Id at 2957-58.
209 Id.
210 Id
211 Id at 2955.
212 Id at 2956-57.
213 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
214 Brief for the U.S. Government as Amicus Curiae 3.
215 103 S. Ct. at 2956.
216 Id at 2755-56.
217 Id
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domestic corporation and, therefore, foreign interests should not be con-
cerned. 21 8 The fact that subsidiaries located in a foreign country were
being taxed was disregarded.
Foreign countries upset by the Container decision can retaliate with
taxing measures that would be detrimental to U.S. interests. In fact,
such retaliatory measures were discussed in letters submitted by Canada,
France, the United Kingdom, and others, to protest the states' use of
formula apportionment measures. 21 9 Even if foreign governments agree
that Container is an American concern (since it has been found to be a
unitary business), they may still be concerned that such a tax will dis-
courage American investment in foreign countries.
220
The decision in Contatner can perhaps be explained as a reaction to
the criticism of Japan Line. After Japan Ltne, there were concerns that
the costs of foreign commerce would be shouldered by local taxpayers. 2 2'
Although the Court in Japan Line destroyed a potential source of revenue
for the states, a vast source of potential state revenue was opened up in
Contatner. This fact was immediately apparent to Florida,222 which en-
acted a statute that essentially duplicates California's statute in order to
get its share of revenue from multinational corporations.
The Container decision illuminates the need for a central coordinat-
ing authority or some form of uniform legislation to guide the states in
taxing multistate and multinational corporations. A common formula
apportionment method with uniform definitions is needed. More clear-
cut guidelines must be formulated concerning what constitutes a unitary
business. A tribunal to settle multiple taxation problems would also be
helpful. Local efforts by the states have not solved the problem, and the
Supreme Court cannot manage the difficult task of studying and assess-
ing all possible contingencies. 22 3 The task belongs to Congress.
With its decision in Contatner the Supreme Court chose to act in an
area where action is needed. 224 The Court has done little, however, to
clear up the confusion that surrounds the unitary business principle and
its application, or to provide uniformity in state apportionment formu-
las. The Contai'ner decision gives states the opportunity to obtain vast
amounts of revenue by taxing multinational corporations according to
the "Court-approved" California apportionment method. Unfortu-
nately, it may also create disputes in the international business world.
218 Id
219 Id. at 2960 & n.4.
220 The dissent comments on this possibility in Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2959.
221 See Note, supra note 117, at 808.
222 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
223 The Court also indicates that it will begin to be very selective about what cases it will
hear in regard to whether a finding of a unitary business was proper. 103 S. Ct. at 2946 & n.14.
224 The Container decision has been criticized for not going far enough. WhiteNack, supra
note 203, at 779-82 argues that the Supreme Court could have avoided future needless litigation
by stating what actions invoke the prohibition of the commerce clause.
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Uniformity is needed in this area. Perhaps the Court, with its action,
will persuade others to act.
-CATHY M. RUDISILL
